



n March 4, 1951, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Thomas B. McCabe, and the Secretary of
the Treasury, John W. Snyder, released a joint announcement of an
understanding that has come to be known as the Treasury–Federal Reserve
Accord.1 That watershed agreement released the Federal Reserve from the
obligation to support the market for U.S. government debt at pegged prices
and laid the institutional foundation for the independent conduct of mone-
tary policy in the postwar era. This special issue of the Economic Quarterly
commemoratesthe50thanniversaryoftheTreasury–FederalReserveAccord.
The Federal Reserve’s support for government debt prices during World
War II kept yields from rising and reduced the direct cost to the Treasury of
ﬁnancing wartime deﬁcits. Although this support effectively monetized the
debt, price controls helped limit inﬂation. The policy of supporting govern-
mentsecuritypriceswasstillineffectwhenhostilitiesbrokeoutontheKorean
peninsula in the middle of 1950. As inﬂationary pressures emerged later that
year, the Federal Open Market Committee sought to raise short-term interest
rates. The Treasury resisted, and the issue came to a head in the dramatic
events of late January and early February of 1951, which set in motion the
negotiations that produced theAccord.2
The central issue at stake was control of the Federal Reserve System’s
balance sheet. By committing to support government debt prices, the Federal
Reserve in effect gave up control over the amount of government debt it held.
When the Treasury sold new securities or the public became less willing to
hold existing Treasury securities, the Fed was forced to purchase them on the
open market to prevent yields from rising. Since Fed asset purchases required
The author would like to thank Marvin Goodfriend, Robert Hetzel, and Thomas Humphrey
for helpful comments. The views expressed do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 The announcement read: “The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full
accord with respect to debt-management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their
common purpose to assure the successful ﬁnancing of the Government’s requirements and, at the
same time, to minimize monetization of the public debt” (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1951, p. 267).
2 See articles by Hetzel and Leach in this issue or Stein (1969), Chapter 10.
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increasesintheFed’smonetaryliabilities—eithercurrencyorreserveaccount
balances—theFedalsoeffectivelysurrenderedcontroloverthemonetarybase.
Without the understanding embodied in theAccord, the Fed would have been
unable to pursue an independent monetary policy by varying the size of its
balance sheet.
Nevertheless, since the Accord the Federal Reserve has relied on open
marketpurchasesandsalesofU.S.Treasurysecuritiestoimplementmonetary
policy. The supply of Treasury securities outstanding has always exceeded
the amount necessary to satisfy the Federal Reserve’s needs. In essence, the
Fed has been able to limit itself to a policy of “Treasuries-only.” Recently,
however, the U.S. government has run budgetary surpluses that if continued
will result in the supply of outstanding Treasury securities falling below the
volume necessary to meet the Fed’s needs.
In the lead article, “What Assets Should the Federal Reserve Buy?,”
J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., and Marvin Goodfriend consider problems posed by
the possibility of dwindling supplies of Treasury securities.3 They argue that
theFed’sassetacquisitionpracticesshouldadheretotwocloselyrelatedprinci-
ples in order to preserve the Fed’s independence and support monetary policy.
First, asset acquisition should respect the integrity of ﬁscal policy. The Fed’s
balance sheet should not be used to circumvent constitutional safeguards on
the ﬁscal policy process, for example, by channeling credit to favored con-
stituencies. Second, assetacquisitionshouldinsulatetheFedfromthepolitics
of credit allocation. Exposing the Fed to pressure from groups seeking credit
on favorable terms risks compromising sound monetary policy for the sake of
resisting credit market distortions, or, conversely, yielding to interest group
pressure in order to protect the integrity of monetary policy.
Broaddus and Goodfriend point out that the Treasuries-only policy con-
forms well to both principles. It prevents the Fed from holding private assets,
fromcompromisingtheintegrityofﬁscalpolicy, andfrombecominginvolved
in credit allocation. The authors propose that the Treasury continue to issue
sufﬁcient debt for the Fed to buy, even as budgetary surpluses continue. Such
a program would have no direct economic consequences since the interest
cost of the incremental debt issued for the Fed to buy would be offset by the
Federal Reserve’s remittance to the Treasury of the interest earnings on that
debt. The Treasury could invest the proceeds of the incremental debt issue
in private assets and thereby beneﬁt directly from the return on those assets.
However, nothing would require the Treasury to acquire private assets; the
proceeds could instead be used to reduce taxes or increase expenditures.
Ineffect,theproposaladvancedbyBroaddusandGoodfriendisthemirror
image of the 1951 Accord. In 1951, the Treasury pledged not to compel the
3 Their article ﬁrst appeared in the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 2000 Annual Report.J. M. Lacker: Introduction 3
Fed to purchase Treasury securities. Broaddus and Goodfriend propose that
the Treasury pledge not to deprive the Fed of Treasury securities. In both
cases, at issue is control over the Fed’s balance sheet and the independence of
monetary policy from ﬁscal policy. The 1951 Accord freed the Fed from the
pressure to monetize government debt for ﬁscal purposes. The Broaddus and
Goodfriend proposal would free the Fed from the pressure to allocate credit
for ﬁscal purposes. Their newAccord would allow the regime initiated by the
1951Accordtocontinue. Itwasunderthisregimethatmonetarypolicy“came
of age,” in the words of Goodfriend, and has now successfully maintained low
inﬂation since the mid-1980s.4 This experience suggests that we should be
waryofdrasticchangesinourmonetaryinstitutionsandthattheBroaddusand
Goodfriend proposal for retaining key features of theAccord regime deserves
serious consideration.
ThelogicofBroaddusandGoodfriend’sproposalwasanticipatedinGood-
friend’s 1994 article “Why We Need an Accord for Federal Reserve Credit
Policy: A Note,” which discusses the distinction between credit policy and
monetary policy and is reprinted as the second article in this issue.5 Monetary
policy refers to changes in the stock of central bank monetary liabilities, that
is,currencyandreserveaccountbalances. Creditpolicyaltersthecomposition
of a central bank’s assets, holding the stock of monetary liabilities ﬁxed. Ex-
amples include liquidity assistance to particular institutions, sterilized foreign
exchange operations, and transfers of Federal Reserve assets to the Treasury
for the purpose of deﬁcit reduction. Credit policy is a form of ﬁscal policy
since it generally has distributional or public ﬁnance consequences.
The1951AccordfreedtheFederalReservetoconductmonetarypolicyin-
dependently to stabilize the macroeconomy. Goodfriend’s 1994 essay argues
for a similar Accord to prevent ﬁscal misuse of central bank credit policies
and to protect central bank independence. A fully independent central bank
signiﬁcantly enhances the effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization pol-
icy. But stabilization policy requires independent central bank discretion only
over the stock of monetary liabilities, that is, the size of the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet. Credit policy is unnecessary for the conduct of monetary policy.
It erodes the integrity of the ﬁscal policy appropriations process prescribed
by the Constitution and jeopardizes the institutional independence on which
monetary policy effectiveness relies.
Broaddus and Goodfriend’s Treasuries-only proposal is a corollary of
Goodfriend’s 1994 proposed Credit Accord. Goodfriend did not anticipate
that outstanding Treasury debt might fall low enough to necessitate Federal
Reserve purchase of private assets. If the debt were to fall that low, the Fed
would be forced to choose among private assets. This discretion is precisely
4 See Goodfriend (1997).
5 This article ﬁrst appeared in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking in August 1994.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
what Broaddus and Goodfriend are worried about. In an era of declining
Treasuryindebtedness, Goodfriend’sproposedCreditAccordleadsinevitably
to the Broaddus-Goodfriend proposal.
The third article in our special issue, “The Treasury-Fed Accord: A New
Narrative Account” by Robert L. Hetzel and Ralph F. Leach, presents a nar-
rative account of the dramatic events that led to the 1951 Accord, including
leaked memoranda, shrewd bond market maneuvers, and a disputed meeting
withPresidentTruman. Thisepisodeisasaboutasgrippingandsuspensefulas
monetary policy gets. The reminiscences of Ralph Leach, a Board economist
at the time, add previously unpublished details to the account. Leach was a
witnesstoandattimesaparticipantintheeventsastheyunfolded; heattended
many of the relevant FOMC meetings and worked closely with many of the
principals. Leach later went on to a career on Wall Street.
The authors’ account makes clear that the Fed was anxious to assert a
degree of institutional independence that would allow it to resist inﬂationary
pressures then emerging by raising short-term interest rates. The Fed’s oppo-
nents favored lower interest rates. The exchange in late January 1951, at the
height of the crisis, between Governor Marriner Eccles (at that time no longer
Chairman, thanks to President Truman) and Representative Wright Patman
(the populist Texan) is instructive.6 After suggesting that the Fed has an obli-
gation to protect the public against high interest rates, Patman asks, “Who is
master, the Federal Reserve or the Treasury?” to which Eccles replies, “How
do you reconcile the Treasury’s position of saying they want the interest rate
low, with the Federal Reserve standing ready to peg the market, and at the
same time expect to stop inﬂation?” Later Eccles declares, “Either the Fed-
eral Reserve should be recognized as having some independent status, or it
should be considered as simply an agency or a bureau of the Treasury.” The
tensionbetweenpressureforlowerinterestratesandtheneedtosteminﬂation
would repeatedly strain the Fed’s independence in the postwar era.
The fourth article in this issue, “After the Accord: Reminiscences on the
BirthoftheModernFed,”alsobyHetzelandLeach,recountshowkeyfacetsof
our contemporary monetary policy regime emerged in the years immediately
following theAccord. For example, the government bond market, which now
plays such a pivotal role in the formulation of monetary policy, was much less





role, shifting inﬂuence from the Trading Desk in NewYork to the FOMC in
6 See Hetzel and Leach, “The Treasury-Fed Accord: A New Narrative Account,” p. 44.J. M. Lacker: Introduction 5
Washington. And a further challenge to Fed independence would arise in
the form of “Operation Twist.” The authors’ account, building on Leach’s
recollections, reminds us that it took several years after the watershed events
of 1951 to restore the Fed’s monetary policy independence.
In the ﬁnal article, “Monetary Policy Frameworks and Indicators for the
FederalReserveinthe1920s,”ThomasM.Humphreycritiquesthepracticeof
monetarypolicyintheperiodbeforetheFedcametorelyonTreasuries-only.7
Monetary policy during the 1920s was guided by the needs-of-trade, or real
bills, doctrine, which held that money created by loans to ﬁnance real produc-
tion rather than speculation has no inﬂuence on prices, and that ﬂuctuations
in money are caused by ﬂuctuations in prices and output, not vice versa. As
a result, Fed ofﬁcials focused on indicators—nominal interest rates, member
bank borrowings, and the commercial paper available for rediscounting—that
at the start of the Great Depression signaled easy monetary conditions and
no need for correction. In contrast, indicators based on the quantity theoretic
analysis of Irving Fisher and others—the money stock, the price level, and
real interest rates—were readily available at the time and correctly signaled
that money and credit conditions were contractionary and would worsen the
slump. Evidently, the tools were available that would have allowed the Fed to
avoid the depression, or at least mitigate its severity.
A reexamination of monetary policy during the 1920s is relevant to the
anniversary of the Accord because of the contrast it provides with the policy
framework that ensued after the Accord. As Humphrey points out, monetary
policy under the needs-of-trade doctrine had the potential to destabilize the
price level and the money stock. With the 1951Accord, the Fed began to put
in place policies to provide for the stability of money and prices. Although it
wouldtakefourdecadestoachieveprice-levelstability,withoutthesigniﬁcant
shift in monetary policy practice represented by theAccord, this achievement
would not have been possible. Humphrey vividly describes the preceding
regime and documents that the tools to implement the post-Accord approach
were available more than 20 years earlier, had policymakers been interested.
Humphrey’sarticlealsotouchesonthequestionofwhatassetstheFederal
Reserve should buy. Policymakers in the 1920s believed that the type of
assetstheFedheld—whetherthoseassetsrepresentedlendingfor“productive”
uses—wascriticaltotheefﬁcacyofmonetarypolicy. Inessence,theneeds-of-
trade doctrine mistook credit policy for monetary policy. Ironically then, the
Fed’spreoccupationwithnon-Treasuryassetsmayhavehinderedtheevolution
of monetary policy in the early years.
The 1951 Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord was a key turning point in
the century-long evolutionary process by which American monetary policy
7 Forthcoming in the Cato Journal, vol. 21 (Fall 2001), and printed here with permission.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
has come of age. We take many aspects of our current monetary regime for
granted, butasourleadarticleemphasizes, weshouldnotoverlookthecritical
institutional foundations of the Fed’s success. The next century could well
bring new and unforeseen challenges to American monetary arrangements.
By way of preparation, now is an apt time to pause in appreciation of the
dramatic events of 1951.
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